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Abstract
In this thematic issue, the question whether EU decision making might be characterised by an excess of transparency
stands central. This contribution addresses an issue that precedes such questions of quantity: that of transparency’s qual-
ities, i.e., its specific shape. From an early point in time, transparency in the EU has been equated with the narrow and
legalistic notion of ‘access to documents.’ Although since then, transparency has become associated with a wider range
of practices, the Union has not managed to shake off the concept’s association with bureaucracy, opacity, and complexity.
This remains the case, in spite of the fact that administrations and decision-makers across the world increasingly utilise the
possibilities of technological innovation to communicate more directly with their electorates. In this changing communica-
tive context, this commentary considers whether EU transparency as access to documents is still fit for purpose. It does
so by exploring access policy from the vantage point of legal developments, administrative practices, political dynamics,
and technological innovations. The commentary concludes that while improvements are needed, the access to documents
concept endures. However, access to documents needs to be complemented by constructive (rather than predatory) pub-
lic justification and contestation, to remain viable.
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1. Introduction
Government transparency is a many-faced metaphor.
Ask 10 citizens (or, for that matter, politicians) how they
think government should be made more transparent,
and you might expect eleven answers. In the EU con-
text however, the notion of transparency was quickly
boxed in. As soon as clamours for a more transparent EU
emerged in the early 1990s, the Council and Commission,
soon followed by the Parliament, agreed to cast trans-
parency in the mould of access to documents (Council
& Commission Code of Conduct of 31 December 1993,
1993); European Parliament Decision of 10 July 1997,
1997). This put the Union on a clear institutional path,
culminating in a treaty base and dedicated legislation in
the form of Regulation 1049/2001 (2001) on access to
the institutions’ documents.
To be true, other important transparency provisions,
most notably related to open legislative meetings and
lobbying, followed suit, most recently, with the adop-
tion of an interinstitutional agreement on a lobby reg-
ister. Nevertheless, access to documents remains the
unmistakable frontispiece of the Union’s transparency
efforts. Under the legal letter of Regulation 1049/2001,
“applicants” request documents “held by an institu-
tion,” subject to exceptions determined within a care-
fully calibrated application procedure and overseen by
the Court of Justice and the Ombudsman. EU trans-
parency thus unmistakably functions foremost “in the
humdrum world of administrative laws,” experts, and
courts (Fenster, 2015, p. 150; see also Hood, 2007,
pp. 195–196). As a result, the Union is still perceived as
complex and thus opaque.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 292–295 292
The neigh-automatic association of ‘transparency’
with ‘documents’ in the EU may largely be explained by
its ready availability and acceptability as a policy tem-
plate at the time of adoption. However, it is less obvi-
ous in light of the ambitious normative substance it
sought to carry. According to political declarations of
the time, transparency was supposed to explain the EU
better, bring it closer to citizens, and enable them to
participate more actively in decision-making processes.
In a context where decision-makers and citizens connect
directly through new technologies, the question seems
warranted whether the EU’s strong reliance on trans-
parency as access to documents still fits the bill. This
contribution explores this question from the perspective
of respectively the law, administrative and political prac-
tices, and technological innovations in the EU.
2. EU Access to Documents in a Changing Context
From the outset, the approach to access to documents
policy has been decisively legalistic. Initially, this was
used as a defencemechanism to keep curious journalists
out of the door. Over time, it resulted in a greater role for
the Court of Justice, which often expanded the interpre-
tation of the access rules. However, the policy’s legalistic
approach also alienated all but the most dogged EU citi-
zens, or those that possess the requisite legal knowledge
or have the financial resources to acquire it. The right of
access to documents has been characterised as ‘wide but
shallow’: It covers many forms of information and most
entities and instances, but is hard to enforce in a man-
ner that preserves its utility. Courts, for example, can-
not apply coercive instruments, such as fines, to com-
pel institutions to comply (Rossi & Vinagre e Silva, 2017).
What ismore, certain important functional aspects of the
decision-making process remain out of the remit of the
rules. Importantly, the right of access only applies to doc-
uments that already exist. A few limited exceptions aside
(such as the duty to publish voting outcomes), institu-
tions are not bound tominimal record-keeping standards.
Moreover, lobby inputs directed towards the Union leg-
islator are equally not covered by the access rules.
The above-described legal circumstances spill over
into the administrative realm. What immediately strikes
access requesters is the formalism of the procedure,
larded with references to legal doctrine, often to sig-
nal limitations in the institutions’ access obligations.
Applicants may easily experience such formalism as
attempts to thwart their access rights. When consider-
ing the material aspect of disclosure practices, we see
that the online ‘interface’ for accessing documents cre-
ates various hurdles. Dispersed across multiple registers,
the institutions’ hundreds of thousands of documents
can only be retrieved via search forms containing largely
imponderable ‘legalese’ search categories. Open search
criteria such as ‘word in title’ in turn yield document
inventories of which only policy experts are in a posi-
tion to guesstimate the completeness or coherence. One
level deeper, the potential of documents as vessels of
transparency depends on their quality. In a classical view
of the bureaucratic organisation, this should be a good
fit, as efficient decision-making requires sound record-
keeping for tracking progress, stabilising calibrated com-
promises, and preserving institutional memory. In real-
ity, document management suffers from inconsistent
drafting and registration practices, exclusion of impor-
tant information from records, and key documents occa-
sionally getting lost (European Court of Auditors, 2016,
paras. 71–75; Hillebrandt & Novak, 2016, p. 533).
The latter point chimes with the political perspec-
tive of access to documents in the EU. Political decision-
makers prefer informal decision-making, as manifested
by consensus-oriented negotiating norms in both inter-
nal and interinstitutional negotiations. Particularly in the
Council, characterised by lingering diplomatic norms,
publicity of political differences is not considered in the
institution’s best interest (Andrzejewski, 2020). In this
context, implementing public access to documents is like
asking the fox the guard the henhouse. Although trans-
parency suppression is subject to court oversight, cir-
cumvention methods are manifold and difficult to police.
Controversial documents, for example, are routinely dis-
closed with a large time lag, to allow member states
to negotiate compromises before the public is informed
(Cross & Bølstad, 2015, p. 219). The fact that the EU
decision-making system is hard-wired for consensus-
oriented informality means that decision-makers take
measures to control the flow and timing of information
disclosures, with the purpose of claiming successes and
disowning failures. In extreme situations, this leads to
leaks or hostile press releases aiming to derail nego-
tiations or paint the EU in a bad light (Bayer, 2019).
In such cases, disclosure replaces the bureaucratic logic
of access to documents as ‘objective reporting’ with a
political logic of obstruction and virtue signalling.
Finally, access to documents can be considered from
a technological perspective. In a tangible way, the estab-
lishment of online registers amplified access to docu-
ments policy compared to pre-Internet days, by reducing
the transaction costs of accessing EU documents. In the
Council, for example, access applications initially quadru-
pled and eventually multiplied nine-fold compared to
access request directly before implementation of the
register. The number of visitors consulting documents
directly online is well over a hundred times larger. Digital
formats such as data- and meta-datasets further enrich
the legal concept of a ‘document.’ However, another
new incarnation, that of digital and portable commu-
nication tools, poses more of a problem for access
rights. As significant parts of negotiations move to email
and apps, essential information risks being excluded
from the right of public access (e. g. European Council,
2019). More recent still is the increased role of political
communication through social media. Phenomena such
as ‘Wikileaks world’ (Hood, 2011) or ‘Trumping trans-
parency’ (Birchall, 2018), have not gained ground in the
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EU context to the extent seen in theUS. Still, socialmedia
have gained a toehold when it comes to system-hostile
communication, relying on false or deliberately misrep-
resented information from official sources (particularly
certain member state governments). Such political mes-
saging does not fit well within the bureaucratic model of
transparency manifest in access to documents policy.
3. Conclusion
Is EU access to documents (still) fit for purpose as
a vehicle for transparency? This commentary answers
with a cautious and qualified ‘yes.’ In spite of the var-
ious shortcomings highlighted, access to documents in
its broad outline remains capable of fulfilling trans-
parency requirements. The definition of a document
under EU law is broad enough to capture its latest
manifestations unknown at the time of the adoption
of Regulation 1049/2001. Moreover, the EU’s organi-
sational nature should correspond well to the bureau-
cratic medium of documents. And while administrations’
sprawling nature makes transparency “improbable” in
any government context (Fenster, 2015, pp. 161–162),
adequate implementation interfaces may go a consid-
erable way in taming complex information, by tying it
to manageable cognitive categories such as procedure,
chronology, and actors’ formal roles. Early technologi-
cal advances demonstrate that major improvement in
unlocking complex information in Internet-based infras-
tructures is possible. Three decades after its introduc-
tion, the essential features of access to documents policy
thus remain upright.
This positive assessment however is bracketed by
two pivotal observations. First, the formalism and legal-
ism that underpin access to documents policy severely
restrict its reach. In practice ‘EU transparency is not
where the people are.’ This debilitating condition is
intensified by political norms of consensus-oriented
informality, leading EU institutions to develop admin-
istrative methods that limit, slow down, or evade
document-based transparency. Both the law in place
and available technologies are in themselves agnostic
instruments that can be used to unveil and to con-
ceal. Shortcomings in the access to documents concept
thus lie foremost within the administrative and polit-
ical sphere, where it is sometimes considered an all-
too-intrusive means for demonstrating one’s commit-
ment to transparency, and selective communication is
thus preferred.
Second, in order to remain viable, the fact-based
‘process orientation’ of access to documents requires
non-document-based complementary communication
with a ‘rationale orientation.’ Public political justifica-
tion and contestation contextualises official informa-
tion and brings it to life (Mansbridge, 2009). Mass and
socialmedia arewell positioned for such communication,
being considerably faster, more readily accessible, and
less complex in content than access to documents pol-
icy. However, in the absence of constructive justification
and contestation, predatory political messaging is given
the opportunity to fill the vacuum and challenge system-
legitimating notions of transparency. Thus, as long as citi-
zens give their European leaders carte blanche to engage
in ‘access to documents as usual,’ particularly the tech-
nocrats and populists among them stand to gain.
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